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1. INTRODUCTION
The United States' trade deficit has been a constant topic of politi-
cal discussion in this country in recent years, despite disagreement
among economists as to its real effect upon the economy. The trade
deficit reached a record $152 billion in 1987, but has been declining
slowly over the past few years, to an estimated $99 billion in 1990.1
Although the gap has been shrinking, the U.S. continues to record its
highest trade deficit with any country with Japan-an approximately
$41 billion shortfall in 1990.'
Recent negotiations between Japan's Ministry of International
Trade and Industry (MITI) and the Office of the United States Trade
Representative (USTR) have focused on a significant portion of the
trade shortfall: construction services. United States construction firms
have historically performed very little work within Japan, and only re-
cently have they begun to win any sizeable contracts at all. As of Janu-
ary 1991, only fourteen U.S. firms were licensed to perform construc-
tion work in Japan, and these firms collectively have been awarded
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I Farnsworth, Import Fall Narrows Trade Gap, N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1990, § 1,
at 31, col. 6. The U.S. trade deficit stood at $119 billion in 1988 and $109 billion in
1989. Id.
2 OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, NATIONAL TRADE
ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 121 (1991) [hereinafter FOREIGN
TRADE BARRIERS]. The 1990 U.S. trade deficit with Japan of $41.1 billion was a
decrease from 1989's figure of $49.0 billion. See id.
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only about $290 million worth of work over the past several years.' Yet
Japanese contractors have had a growing presence in the United States
for many years now. In 1990, 22 Japanese firms were performing con-
struction work in the United States, with contract volume totaling $3.3
billion, and growing.'
Given the potential opening of the Japanese construction market,
the opportunities available to U.S. contractors are significant. Construc-
tion is a far greater contributor to the economy of Japan (where it
constitutes approximately 17% of gross national product), than it is to
the U.S. economy (at about 8.4% of gross national product).' Japan is
the world leader in construction spending with approximately $510 bil-
lion in 1989, just ahead of the United States with an estimated $450 to
$500 billion that year.6 It has been estimated that Japan will need to
spend at least 1,000 trillion yen (approximately $7.7 trillion7 ) on all
types of construction activity between the years 1988 and 2000,8 with
plans to spend at least 430 trillion yen (approximately $3.3 trillion)
during the 1990s solely on infrastructure.' Clearly, even obtaining a
very small fraction of this amount could mean large revenues for U.S.
construction firms and a significant reduction in the trade deficit be-
tween the two countries.
However, the road has not been well paved for those U.S. firms
bidding on construction work in Japan. Despite the Major Projects
Agreement (MPA) reached in 1988,0 very little progress has been
achieved. Japan is one of the most protectionist nations in the industri-
alized world, and its construction industry is probably the least open of
* Id. at 130. As an example of the amount of work awarded to U.S. firms in the
past, the sum total of all U.S. construction activity in Japan during 1986 was one Mrs.
Fields cookie stand. Chalpin, Hostile Takeover-Japanese Style, 9 CONSTRUCTION
LAW. 3, 3 (Jan. 1989).
' The Top 250 International Contractors, ENGINEERING NEWS-RECORD, JuL
22, 1991, at 31.
s S. LEVY, JAPANESE CONSTRUCTION: AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE 45 (1990).
8 Japan's Edge on U.S. Widens, ENGINEERING NEWS-RECORD, Sept. 20, 1990,
at 16.
Although fluctuating constantly, for convenience the exchange rate used
throughout this Comment will be 130 yen to the dollar. For the twelve months ending
September 30, 1991, the dollar traded from a high of 141.6 yen to a low of 124.3 yen
and ended that period at 132.9 yen. See Markets Diary, Wall St. J., Oct. 1, 1991, at
C1, col. 1.
I F. HASEGAWA & THE SHIMIzu GROUP FS, BUILT By JAPAN: COMPETITIVE
STRATEGIES OF THE JAPANESE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 195 (1988).
' Kanabayashi & Brauchli, Prompted by the U.S., Tokyo Slates Trillions in Do-
mestic Spending, Wall St. J., Jan. 3, 1991, at Al, col. 1. Japan agreed to this level of
spending on infrastructure during the U.S.-Japanese Structural Impediments Initiative
(SII) talks. See Japan Public Works up 6%, ENGINEERING NEws-RECORD, Jan. 28,
1991, at 14.
"0 See infra notes 88-97 and accompanying text.
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its markets.11 Japanese trade representatives and government officials
often claim that U.S. firms have failed to penetrate the Japanese con-
struction industry because those firms have not "tried hard enough"
and have not invested the time and effort required to understand Ja-
pan's language, law, and culture.12 However, when the world's largest
exporter of construction services is not active in the world's largest con-
struction market, the focus for the resolution of this problem should be
on the market rather than on the exporter.'3
This Comment will examine those legal, political, and cultural
trade barriers which tend to discourage, if not prohibit, participation by
foreign firms in the Japanese construction market; possible solutions
available both to the U.S. government and to private construction con-
tractors; and what progress has already been made in attempting to
penetrate the Japanese construction market.
2. THE JAPANESE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
2.1. History of Japanese Construction
To comprehend the unique alliance between the Japanese con-
struction industry and the Japanese government, an understanding of
their history and the development of their relationship is necessary.
There were no private "contractors" prior to the Edo Period (1603-
1868) when all large construction projects were built under the direc-
tion of the emperors and shoguns. During the Edo Period, Japan's cap-
ital city was relocated from Kyoto to Tokyo and the country witnessed
the rapid development of cities, with Tokyo becoming the world's larg-
est city during the seventeenth century. As the urbanization of Japan
continued, small carpenters gradually became contractors responsible
for the performance of an entire project.14 During the Meiji Period
(1868-1911), Western architecture and construction techniques began
to have a significant influence within Japan, and the government began
an aggressive program of funding construction and infrastructure im-
11 Setzer, Senate Panel Rips into Japan Construction Pact, ENGINEERING
NEWS-REcORD, Oct. 6, 1988, at 21.
" See Chalpin, supra note 3, at 5.
IS See id. The Japanese government, however, has recently released what it terms
the "five truths" of its construction market: (1) it is open to all foreign firms; (2)
through the Major Projects Agreement, participation of U.S. firms has been effectively
promoted; (3) every construction project not covered by the MPA is still open to foreign
firms; (4) the U.S. public works market is not entirely open to Japanese firms; and (5)
the efforts of U.S. firms have been insufficient to establish a foothold in the Japanese
market. Japan Clears Air on Construction, ENGINEERING NEWS-REcORD, Apr. 15,
1991, at 10.
14 F. HASEGAWA, supra note 8, at 4.
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provements, with particular interest focused on the development of a
national railroad. Initially, the government undertook many of these
projects itself, but as the volume of construction expanded, the govern-
ment began hiring contractors to perform the work. It was during the
Meiji Period that today's leading Japanese construction contractors be-
gan to grow in size and prosper due to the wealth of government
funding.
15
In the early 1930s, Japan's construction activity became military
in focus and government once again took the lead in planning, financ-
ing, designing, and building many of Japan's largest construction
projects. Contractors essentially took a subcontracting position to that of
the government. The role of the construction firm during this period
generally was limited to providing only the labor required on any pro-
ject.16 Following World War II, Japanese contractors worked with the
government on overseas reconstruction in the Far East and the Pacific,
as part of its government's reparations program, while the government
created a Ministry of Construction in part to work with the private
construction industry in rebuilding Japan's infrastructure.1"
During the 1960s and 1970s, new construction reached very high
levels in Japan-as high as 20% of its gross national product in 1970.18
With increasing industrialization and a further concentration of Ja-
pan's populace in its cities, its environment and infrastructure began to
become overburdened. Government spending was channeled into new
civil engineering projects aimed at improving the country's air, water,
and transportation resources. The largest firms during the late 1970s
and early 1980s were focused on the domestic construction market, pri-
marily on the improvement of Japan's infrastructure."
2.2. Current Construction Market
Although the Japanese construction industry is comprised of over
520,000 contractors, the vast majority of them are extremely small.
Half of these firms are just one-person operations with no other em-
ployees, and nearly 90% are capitalized at less than 10 million yen
(approximately $77,000).2° The Japanese construction industry is dom-
inated by just a half-dozen large general contractors 1 known as the
15 Id. at 5.
16 S. LEvy, supra note 5, at 37.
17 See id.
18 Id. at 38.
19 Id.
20 F. HASEGAWA, supra note 8, at 3.
21 General contractors are known in Japan as zenecons. Id.
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"Big Six,"2 with combined international contract revenues approach-
ing $88 billion in 1990.3
The Ministry of Construction today operates not only as an over-
seer and regulator but mostly as a promoter of Japanese construction
activity. The Ministry is a giant bureaucracy with over 26,000 employ-
ees24 which oversees the implementation of Japan's various construction
laws and regulations, licenses contractors, sets construction industry
standards,25 and acts as an important sponsor of construction research
and development programs.2" In 1986, more than half a million public
construction projects were carried out, with the majority under the su-
pervision of the Construction Ministry. 7
Government has played, and continues to play, a significant role in
the Japanese construction industry. Public works projects28 account for
over 40% of all construction activity in Japan, more than twice the
percentage of government spending in the United States.2 9 These
projects are also more sought after by contractors in Japan since 40% of
the contracted amount of the project is paid by the government in ad-
vance, while the work of subcontractors is often paid for up to a year
later."°
Since Japanese contractors are much more dependent upon work
from the government, far more so than contractors in the United States,
their political power and influence are significantly greater. This makes
it even more difficult for foreign firms, which lack the political connec-
tions developed over years of working with government agencies, to win
construction contracts. Combined with the fact that Japan has histori-
cally been a very closed society and is extremely protective of its domes-
" S. LEVy, supra note 5, at 3. The "Big Six" are Kajima Corp., Kumagai Gumi
Co., Ohbayashi Corp., Shimizu Construction Co., Taisei Corp., and Takenaka Corp.
Id.
" See The Top 250 International Contractors, ENGINEERING NEWS-RECORD,
Jul. 22, 1991, at 36-37.
24 S. LEVY, supra note 5, at 340.
2 Kashiwagi, Rubin & Harris, Construction Law and Practice in Japan, 9
CONSTRUCTION LAW., 1, 39 (Jan. 1989).
26 S. LEVY, supra note 5, at 340. Various professional and trade groups, includ-
ing the Architectural Institute of Japan, the Architectural Association of Japan, the
Japan Architects Association, the Japan Society of Civil Engineers, and the Associated
General Contractors of Japan help the Ministry determine such industry practices.
Kashiwagi, Rubin & Harris, supra note 25, at 39.
27 K. VAN WoLFEREN, THE ENIGMA OF JAPANESE POWER 115 (1990).
," The term "public works" as used throughout this Comment refers to all con-
struction projects that are financed from government sources, and does not include pri-
vately-funded civil engineering projects.
", See S. LEVY, supra note 5, at 40.
3O K. VAN WOLFEREN, supra note 27, at 120.
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tic markets,31 foreign firms will need patience, commitment, and a
long-term strategy in order to have any chance at success.
3. JAPANESE CONSTRUCTION LAW AND REGULATION
3.1. Licensing
All contractors must obtain an official license from the government
as required by the Construction Contractors Law." Licenses are ob-
tained either from the local prefectural government s if the contractor
has only one office, or from the Ministry of Construction if the contrac-
tor has offices in two or more prefectures.3 4 There are two types of
contractors' licenses: common construction business licenses and special
construction business licenses. 5 Large general contractors who wish to
subcontract a significant portion of their work will usually need to ob-
tain a special license," because they will be required to perform at a
higher duty of support and guidance for their subcontractors since they
are in a position to manipulate those subcontractors.3 7 Licenses are
generally only valid for a period of three years, although under most
circumstances they are renewable at the company's option.38
Foreign firms -are permitted to apply for and obtain construction
-licenses in Japan. However, they must satisfy the same requirements as
domestic contractors, such as "ownership of a minimum amount of
property and the employment of a minimum number of qualified con-
struction engineers in Japan."3 9 In addition to such objective criteria,
more subjective matters are examined for each applicant, including
S At least one study has determined that Japan is the most heavily protected
market in the developed world. See Punke, Structural Impediments to United States-
Japanese Trade: The Collision of Culture and Law, 23 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 55, 57
(1990). Actually, Japan has very low tariffs when compared to other industrialized
nations. However, non-tariff barriers are used by Japan as the primary impediment to
the importation of foreign goods and services. See id. at 57-58 & n.14. See also Choate,
Political Advantage: Japan's Campaign for America, HARV. Bus. REv. 87, 90-91
(Sept.-Oct. 1990) (discussion of Japan's "six excuses" for why it must have a protec-
tionist trade policy).
11 Curl, Opportunities for Foreign Construction and Design Firms in Japan, 10
Bus. L. REV. 128, 129 (May 1989).
33 A Japanese prefecture is analogous to a U.S. state.
" Curl, supra note 32, at 129.
35 See S. LEVY, supra note 5, at 69.
3' Id. Contractors who will perform all of their own work can obtain a general
license and contractors who plan to subcontract more than 10 million yen (approxi-
mately $77,000) worth of work need to obtain a special license. Id. at 69-70.
37 ASIAN PRODUCTIVITY ORG., THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY IN ASIA: A
SURVEY 58 (1983). One contractor cannot receive both a common and a special license
for the same construction project. Id.
" S. LEVY, supra note 5, at 70.
31 See F. HASEGAWA, supra note 8, at 6.
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managing capability, technical staffing and capacity, and financial cred-
ibility and sincerity to contractees.10 All applications for construction
licenses, whether made to the prefectural government or to the Minis-
try of Construction, must be made in Japanese."1 These requirements
have presented a significant obstacle to non-Japanese contractors at-
tempting to obtain a construction license.
Following the recent accord spelled out in the Major Projects
Agreement, new regulations have been enacted to simplify the acquisi-
tion of Japanese construction licenses by foreign contractors. These
rules require only that a foreign applicant must prove: (1) that it has a
manager with construction experience and an engineer on staff with
experience and the appropriate technical skills; (2) that it practices
sound business principles; and (3) that it has successfully fulfilled all of
its prior construction contract obligations.' 2
Bechtel Group, Inc, the San Fransisco-based construction firm,
through its Tokyo-based subsidiary Overseas Bechtel, Inc., became the
first U.S. construction contractor to be licensed in Japan in 1987,"' fol-
lowed shortly by Schal Associates, Inc. of Chicago in 1988."" There are
currently fourteen U.S. contractors holding Japanese construction
licenses."5
3.2. Prequalification and Bidding
Contracting for public construction in Japan is done through a
system of competitive bidding. 8 Japanese law requires open competi-
tive bidding on all public construction projects, although under certain
circumstances designated competitive bidding or even negotiated con-
tracts may be used.47 Under designated competitive bidding, bidders are
selected by the government agency soliciting such bids based signifi-
cantly upon the contractors' qualifications, and in practice this is the
method predominantly used.
For private construction projects any method may be used, and the
most common is through negotiated contracts-either with a single con-
40 ASIAN PRODUcTivrrY ORG., supra note 37, at 59.
41 See Curl, supra note 32, at 129. See also Japan License for Bechtel?, ENGI-
NEERING NEws-REcORD, Sept. 24, 1987, at 61 (Japanese officials "claim Bechtel's
application was delayed because the company filled it out in English instead of Japa-
nese," despite Bechtel's claim that "the application was submitted in Japanese").
41 S. LEVY, supra note 5, at 396.
43 Bechtel Gets Big Japanese Contract, ENGINEERING NEwS-RECORD, Aug. 10,
1989, at 16.
44 S. LEVY, supra note 5, at 389.
'1 FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS, supra note 2, at 130.
46 3 Z. KrrAGAWA, DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN Part II § 6.04[1] (1990).
47 Id.
1991]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
tractor or with a small group of preselected contractors. However, for
private companies, engaged in public services, such as utilities, desig-
nated competitive bidding must be used.4
The process for bidding on private projects in Japan is thus simi-
lar to that in the United States. However, for public projects the desig-
nated competitive bidding system as it operates in Japan is vastly dif-
ferent."9 The Ministry of Construction compiles an annual ranking of
contractors. Each firm's rating is based upon a variety of fac-
tors-including financial condition and operating history-and that rat-
ing is critical in determining the firm's position, if any, on the prequali-
fied bidders list. 50 In order to rank high on that list, a construction firm
must show a successful work history of completed projects, and until
recently, only those projects completed in Japan were allowed to count
towards the rankings.
51
This practice obviously created a tremendous disadvantage to any
new foreign firms trying to enter the Japanese market. These firms
could not receive high rankings until they had a proven track record of
experience in Japan, but they could not get that experience without a
sufficiently high ranking to win their first contract.52 However, this
policy was changed when the Ministry of Construction granted a li-
cense to Overseas Bechtel, Inc. based upon construction work per-
formed outside of Japan, and the Japanese government no longer re-
,quires U.S. firms to have prior experience in Japan before being
licensed and prequalified on a particular project.
53
In addition to the prequalification restriction, Japanese law pro-
vides that persons who have committed certain specified unfair or im-
proper acts in connection with government contract work within the
previous two years, and firms employing any such person as an agent,
manager, or employee, may not compete in bidding. Other require-
48 Id.
49 S. LEvY, supra note 5, at 148.
11 See id. at 72. The specific data required for ranking are: annual sales volume of
completed projects of a nature similar to the one being bid, number of employees in the
company, owned capital, current ratio, ratio of fixed assets to capital, ratio of net profit
to total liabilities plus net worth, number of years in business, work records and work
history, construction machinery owned, safety record, and record of labor relations. See
id.
51 Id. at 148.
52 This is the classic "Catch-22" situation. Id.
5 Dryden, Usui & Setzer, Accord Reached on U.S. Access to 14 Major Projects
in Japan, ENGINEERING NEws-REcoRD, Apr. 7, 1988, at 12. Approval of Bechtel's
license had been delayed, despite the fact that it had a presence in Japan for 27 years
and had maintained an office in Tokyo for 16 years. Bechtel had been providing engi-
neering and consulting services, but no actual construction work. See Japan License for
Bechtel?, ENGINEERING NEws-RECORD, Sept. 24, 1987, at 61.
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ments for qualification may be made by the government agency, minis-
try, or official in charge of the particular contract.
54
When bidding for public works projects is done through open
competitive bidding, public notice must first be given. Publication of
notice can occur not less than ten days prior to the bidding date, but
can be shortened to as few as five days prior to bidding in cases of
urgency.5 5 This requirement obviously creates an inherent disadvantage
to non-Japanese firms, who are generally dealing with foreign specifi-
cations, language, and law. However, under the Major Projects Agree-
ment between Japan and the United States, bidders for certain identi-
fied projects which have been targeted for increased foreign
participation will be allowed forty days after notification to place their
bids.
5 6
On public projects, the contractor who submits the lowest bid is
not guaranteed to receive the contract, even if it had been prequalified.
The government agency or ministry soliciting the bid generally formu-
lates its own estimate of the cost of the work, a certain range with a
specified floor and ceiling, and "[i]f all bids received exceed [the] ceiling
price, the project may be rebid with an entirely different group of con-
tractors. 1 7 Any bid received which is markedly below the floor price
may be deemed an attempt at "dumping. ' 58 Any such bid may be re-
jected by the government if, because of the low price, the contractor is
determined to be "incapable of properly performing the contract," or if
it is "feared that accepting the bid will disturb the order of fair
trade." 9 In such a case, the low bid will be disqualified and the next
lowest bid which is within the acceptable range will be awarded the
contract.60
4. RESTRAINTS OF TRADE AFFECTING FOREIGN FIRMS
While in theory the prequalification procedure would seem to
have the effect of simplifying the bidding process by assuring that any
low bidder would be qualified to perform the work, in practice it has
led to collusive bidding, pre-bidding consultation, and price fixing
among bidders." Bid rigging, generally known as dango, although ille-
8 Z. KrrAGAWA, supra note 46, § 6.04[2][a].
, Id. § 6.04[21[b].
58 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 924 (Jun. 20, 1990). See infra notes 88-97 and
accompanying text.
57 S. LEVY, supra note 5, at 151-52.
88 Id. at 152.
1 Z. KrrAGAWA, supra note 46, § 6.04[2][e].
:0 Id. See also S. LEVY, supra note 5, at 72.
61 S. LEVY, supra note 5, at 72.
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gal, is an acknowledged practice among Japanese construction firms.6 2
The practice of dango, however, has been said to go well beyond
mere collusion among bidders, and includes widespread government
corruption. In order for a construction contractor to even obtain the
right to bid for a public works project, it must generally obtain the
influence of a politician or government official, and for very large
projects a politician may receive a bribe of as high as 1 billion yen
(approximately $7.7 million).63 Furthermore, a contract may often be
awarded to that bidder on a project who intends to provide a retiring
Construction Ministry official with a second, more lucrative, career.
6 4
The Japanese construction industry is the largest single financial
contributor to the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the ruling party of
Japan. Its contributions have been estimated to make up anywhere
from 10% to as high as 60% of the LDP's total contributions.6 5 In addi-
tion, close personal and family ties exist between high-ranking mem-
bers of the Japanese government and executives in the Japanese con-
struction industry which lead to a further commonality of financial
interest.
66
Dango is illegal in Japan. The Criminal Code prohibits any activ-
ity where "persons participating in an auction or competitive bidding
conspire together and, in order to cause a particular person among
them to be the successful bidder, agree that the others shall not bid
above or below specified prices." 7 Any activity deemed to be collusion
in bidding for government contracts can be punished under the Crimi-
nal Code by a prison term not exceeding three years or a fine not ex-
62 Id. at 195.
63 K. VAN WOLFEREN, supra note 27, at 118. As an indicator of the Ministry of
Construction's influence, the post of construction minister is generally considered, for
the purposes of gaining political power or campaign funds, to be a position of equal
value to that of prime minister or secretary-general of the Liberal Democratic Party.
Id.
SId.
63 See Punke, supra note 31, at 64 n.56 and accompanying text.
66 For example, the youngest daughter of former Prime Minister Noboro
Takeshita is married to the son of the president of Takenaka Corp., a member of the
"Big Six," while his oldest daughter is married to the son of the leader of the Construc-
tion Zoku, an LDP policy group with close ties to the construction industry.
Takeshita's half-brother is married to a daughter of the founder of Fukuda Construc-
tion Co., while Deputy Cabinet Secretary Eichiro Ozawa is married to another daugh-
ter of Fukuda's founder. The daughter of former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone is
married to the heir apparent at Kajima Corp., another member of the "Big Six" and
Japan's largest construction firm. See Chalpin, supra note 3, at 4; Choate, supra note
31, at 92-93.
6" Z. KITAGAWA, supra note 46, § 6.0414][a] (quoting Criminal Code Revision of
1941 Article 96-3 para. 2).
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ceeding 1 million yen (approximately $7,700).6'
Dango is also prohibited by the Anti-Monopoly Law,"9 whose
purpose is to prevent "private monopolization, undue restraint of trade,
and unfair business practices, thereby preserving and promoting free
and fair competition in business activities and promoting democratic
and wholesome development of the national economy. '70 Collusion in
bidding on construction projects clearly comes under the definition of
"undue restraint of trade. 7 1 The Anti-Monopoly Law, like the Crim-
inal Code, also makes collusive activity between bidders a criminal of-
fense. 2 Responsibility for policing dango falls to the Japan Fair Trade
Commission (JFTC),'7  which may "order any violator to file reports,
to cease and desist from such acts, to divest himself of part of his busi-
ness, or to take other necessary measures to eliminate such acts."74 Un-
like the Criminal Code, whose provisions apply only to collusion dur-
ing bidding for government construction, the Anti-Monopoly Law
applies to bidding for private construction projects as well as public
works projects. 5
In addition, dango is further prohibited by the Budget Order,7 '
which denies participation in competitive bidding for two years to per-
sons or firms who have interfered with implementation of fair bidding,
or who have combined with others to impair fair pricing or to acquire
wrongful gain. The Budget Order, however, creates only an adminis-
trative sanction and carries no criminal penalties.7
Despite all of these legal prohibitions on dango, it is still a routine
and widely-accepted practice in Japan that is often called a "gentle-
men's agreement. '7 8 It is usually justified on the basis that it is a "lev-
eling device" used to keep market forces in check, and to keep out other
Asian contractors who utilize cheap labor and could destabilize domes-
tic construction wages. 79 The proponents of dango contend that because
construction is largely a buyer's market,8 0 excess competition without
68 Id.
e Anti-Monopoly and Fair Trade Maintenance Act, Law No. 54 (1947) [herein-
after Anti-Monopoly Law].
70 Z. KITAGAWA, supra note 46, § 6.04[4][b].
-I- Id. § 6.04[4][b][i].
7 S. LEvy, supra note 5, at 195.
78 Z. KrrAGAWA, supra note 46, § 6.04[4][b][i].
74 Id.
75 Id. § 6.04[4][b].
76 Order Concerning Budgets, Settlement of Accounts, and Accounting, Imperial
Order No. 165 (1947) [hereinafter Budget Order].
7 See Z. KrAGAWA, supra note 46, § 6.04[4][c].
78 Punke, supra note 31, at 63.
71 S. LEvY, supra note 5, at 195.
80 Due mostly to the tremendous number of firms in the industry and the signifi-
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dango would lead to thinner profit margins and the bankruptcy of
many construction firms.8
Generally, dango occurs when those firms that have been pre-
qualified for a public works project meet quietly to decide whose turn it
is to win the contract, and to predetermine at what price the contract
should be bid.8 ' Construction firms support dango because it guaran-
tees that each firm involved will receive its "fair share" of an otherwise
overcrowded and extemely competitive market. Any construction firm
that failed to participate or attempted to cheat the system would be
denied any new contracts.8" Politicians and other government officials
tend to look the other way because their financial interests are tied to
those of the construction industry. 4 Dango is clearly one of the most
formidable trade barriers against foreign participation in the Japanese
public construction market.
8 5
"Relational contracting" is another practice which has the effect of
keeping foreign firms out of Japan's private construction market. Large
Japanese corporations tend to develop close, long-term business 'rela-
tionships with a small group of suppliers, including construction con-
tractors. Rather than soliciting competitive bids from a large group of
firms, an owner may repeatedly use the same contractor with whom the
owner has experience and an existing business relationship, despite the
possibility that competitive bidding could or would result in a lower
price. While relational contracting occurs frequently in the United
States, the Japanese place an especially high premium on mutual loy-
alty and long-term relationships. Japanese corporations are unlikely to
sacrifice such a business relationship for an unknown foreign firm, even
one offering a substantially lower price.86
In addition, there is also the possibility for "blackballing" of sub-
contractors. Japanese general contractors have historically maintained
very close relationships with certain subcontractors, and have used these
relationships to threaten to blackball those firms who might perform
work for foreign construction firms. Such a practice in Japan's closed
construction industry would be financially devastating to a small
subcontractor.8 7
cant reliance upon government contracts.
Si See Z. KITAGAWA, supra note 46, § 6.04[4].
s Punke, supra note 31, at 63 n.52.
88 Id. at 63 n.53.
s' See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
85 Punke, supra note 31, at 64.
u See id. at 63.
87 Chalpin, supra note 3, at 3-4. For example, one foreign contractor owns land
in Japan that has remained undeveloped because the firm is unable to hire any Japa-
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5. POLITICAL RESPONSES To JAPAN'S CLOSED CONSTRUCTION
MARKET
5.1. Major Projects Agreement
Trade negotiations concerning the participation of foreign contrac-
tors in the Japanese construction industry occurred in late 1987 and
culminated with an exchange of letters in early 1988 between the U.S.
Secretary of Commerce, C. William Verity, and the Japanese Ambas-
sador to the United States, Nobuo Matsunaga.s 8 These letters created
the Major Projects Agreement (MPA) between the two nations that
would allow and encourage bidding on certain Japanese public con-
struction projects by foreign (i.e. non-Japanese) firms. The MPA pro-
vided for detailed bidding procedures to be followed on fourteen identi-
fied projects"' with a total construction value estimated at almost $17
billion over the subsequent ten to fifteen years. °
The projects covered by the Agreement included not only public
works, but also many so-called "third sector" (private or quasi-pri-
vate 1 ) construction projects where the Japanese government would ac-
tively encourage corporations to make their procurement policies com-
petitive for both domestic and foreign contractors without
discrimination. 2 Despite prior claims that such private construction
contracts were beyond its control, the Japanese government said that it
would require cooperation by owners on specific projects in situations
where the owners have received a government subsidy or have been
nese subcontractors. See id. at 4.
SB Curl, supra note 32, at 128.
, Dryden, Usui & Setzer, supra note 53, at 12. The 14 projects originally desig-
nated in the MPA are: the Trans-Tokyo Bay Highway, the Akashi Strait Bridge, the
Haneda Airport, the Ise Bay Bridge/Highway, the Tokyo Port Redevelopment, the
new Hiroshima Airport, the Minato Mirai 21 conference center, the Kansai Science
City, the NTT Building, the Kansai International Airport terminal, the new Kitaky-
ushu Airport terminal, the Tokyo Teleport, the Osaka Technoport, and Rokko Island.
See id.
So FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS, supra note 2, at 130. The MPA was amended
July 31, 1991 to allow bidding on 23 additional projects. Project Pact Signed with
Japan, But U.S. Wants Complete Access, ENGINEERING NEws-RECORD, Aug. 12,
1991, at 7. Japan agreed to an expansion of the Agreement in response to the threat of
U.S. trade sanctions, but agreed to less than the opening of all public works projects as
was sought by the United States. See Chipello, U.S., Japan Set Pact on Opening
Building Market, Wall St. J., Jun. 3, 1991, at A8, col. 1. In addition to the new
projects, the MPA was amended to provide procedures to bring U.S. firms' complaints
before an independent review board, certification of all bidders that they are not en-
gaged in collusive activities, and procedures for increasing transparency for bidding on
construction projects that have a design component. 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 846
(Jun. 5, 1991).
, Dryden, Usui & Setzer, supra note 53, at 12, 13.
" Curl, supra note 32, at 129.
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given a government franchise. 3 The steps that the Japanese govern-
ment expects third sector owners to take include the "provision of tech-
nical information to foreign firms, giving foreign companies the oppor-
tunity to discuss technical requirements and allowing tenderers a
reasonable time in which to submit their bids." 4 In addition, the Min-
istry of Construction has informally requested Japanese contractors to
"form partnerships and jointly participate in bidding" with foreign
firms.
95
Although the Major Projects Agreement was an important first
step, many in the United States felt that it did not go far enough.96 A
spokesman for the U.S. National Constructors Association was con-
cerned that the Agreement failed to deal with many informal barriers
within the Japanese construction industry, such as dango, that were
even more formidable than the official government barriers.
9 7
5.2. Brooks-Murkowski Amendments
The bilateral negotiations were begun, in part, because of initia-
tives in the U.S. Congress to limit Japanese participation in the U.S.
public works market.9 8 Some observers feel that the only reason the
Japanese were willing to negotiate at all was as a delaying tactic, and
that they had no intention of ever opening the Japanese construction
market.9
An amendment co-sponsored by Senator Frank Murkowski (R-
Alaska) and Representative Jack Brooks (D-Texas) to a continuing
budget resolution in 1987 required that the U.S. Trade Representative
investigate construction trade practices in Japan. Should discrimination
be found to exist in their domestic construction market, then Japanese
contractors100 would be banned from receiving any public works con-
9 See Dryden, Usui & Setzer, supra note 53, at 12.
Curl, supra note 32, at 129.
' Usui, Slowly but Measurably, the Japanese Door Opens, NGINEERING NEws-
RECORD, Apr. 13, 1989, at 12.
91 United States contractors have won less than 1% of the public construction
work made available under the MPA. 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 846 (Jun. 5, 1991).
1 Dryden, Usui & Setzer, supra note 53, at 12, 13. Japanese negotiators insisted
that the dango system not be included in the negotiations and U.S. negotiators agreed
under the rationale that the United States must not call the Japanese "liars." Chalpin,
supra note 3, at 6.
'8 Setzer, Trade Showdown Coming, ENGINEERING NEWS-RECORD, Sept. 1,
1988, at 7. However, a Japanese Ministry of Construction official has denied that the
Verity-Matsunaga negotiations were initiated in response to the U.S. public works ban.
See Dryden, Usui & Setzer, Japan Bows on Public Works as Firms Forge New U.S.
Ties, ENGINEERING NEws-REcORD, Jan. 21, 1988, at 25.
C halpin, supra note 3, at 5.
100 The ban would apply not only to Japanese contractors themselves, but also to
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tracts funded by the U.S. federal government during fiscal year 1988.101
The budget bill containing the so-called Brooks-Murkowski amend-
ment was signed into law by President Reagan in late 1987.102
During the Verity-Matsunaga negotiations, the Brooks-Murkow-
ski amendment saw its first application in the nation's capital. In
March 1988, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
(WMATA) rejected a bid for the construction of twin tunnels and a
rail station received from a joint venture of Kajima Engineering and
Construction, Inc. and Kiewit Construction Co. (of Omaha, Nebraska),
even though it was the lowest bid. WMATA officials stated that the
action was taken under the authority of the Brooks-Murkowski amend-
ment, and that the project would be rebid.'
Similar amendments were proposed for various spending bills in
1988, after the Major Projects Agreement was reached, but these were
much broader in their application. Such an amendment would have
applied to all foreign nations, not just Japan, that restricted access to
their domestic markets, and would have applied to federal public works
projects in fiscal year 1989.'" However, after pressure from the Japa-
nese government, none of the numerous Brooks-Murkowski amend-
ments became law that year.10 5 In a letter from Ambassador Mat-
sunaga to Secretary Verity, he stated that the earlier Agreement, which
waived the prior experience requirement for licensing and designated
certain projects for foreign participation, would be suspended by the
Japanese government "should limits on Japanese participation in U.S.
public works be continued after September 30, 1988 [i.e. end of fiscal
year 1988]. It is the wish of the Government of Japan that these limits
will be lifted before that time."1 6
However, Senator Murkowski has continued to seek equal access
to international markets. He recently sponsored amendments to various
appropriations bills that prohibit foreign companies whose countries
discriminate against U.S. firms from receiving any public works con-
tracts that are funded by those bills to which the amendments are at-
their U.S. subsidiaries and to any joint ventures that include Japanese firms. See
Dryden, Usui & Setzer, supra note 98, at 25.
101 The U.S. government fiscal year ends September 30 of the same numbered
year. See id.
101 See id.
a See Setzer & Usui, D.C. Metro Board Throws Out Bid Citing Ban on Japa-
nese Contractors, ENGINEERING NEws-RECORD, Mar. 10, 1988, at 12.
104 See Setzer, Senate Panel Rips into Japan Construction Pact, ENGINEERING
NEws-RECORD, Oct. 6, 1988, at 21.
105 For a discussion of the tremendous effect that Japanese lobbyists have had in
influencing U.S. policy-making on trade matters, see generally Choate, supra note 31.
'06 See S. LEVY, supra note 5, at 398.
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tached.107 Senator Murkowski has stated that there are "serious allega-
tions that [the Major Projects A]greement has been violated on the first
major contract awarded under that [A]greement,"' 1 8 and he did not
rule out the possibility of shutting out Japanese firms from all feder-
ally-funded construction projects in the future.1 0 9
5.3. Legal Actions
More recently, the U.S. Justice Department, through its Antitrust
Division, urged the Japanese government to enforce more strictly its
own Anti-Monopoly Law, specifically with regard to the practice of
dango in the construction industry." 0 Japan has agreed to enhance the
Anti-Monopoly Law by giving the Japan Fair Trade Commission
(JFTC) broader investigatory powers, and by shifting its priorities
from informal enforcement efforts to formal legal action, in an effort to
restrain such anticompetitive activities as price-fixing, group boycotting,
and bid-rigging."' The JFTC has doubled its fine for those contractors
caught bid-rigging, from 1.5% to 3%, and levied almost twice as much
in fines in 1990, at $7 million, as it did the year before."' However,
U.S. officials have -claimed that these fines were only a fraction of what
needed to be imposed and that the proposed changes would be ineffec-
tive." 3 In response to pressure from the United States, the Japanese
Cabinet in February 1991 approved even higher penalties for illegal
cartels amounting to 6% of sales during the period an illegal cartel is in
force." 4 The United States Justice Department is also considering a
plan to extend its antitrust rules to foreign markets, although Japanese
officials declared that such a decision should be made during multilat-
eral negotiations."1
5
Although rare, criminal prosecutions for dango do occur in Japan.
Last year, executives of three construction firms were sentenced to eight
months in prison after being convicted of bid-rigging on a river-dredg-
ing project. The sentences may be an indication that the Japanese gov-
ernment is becoming more likely to enforce its laws as they relate to
107 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1546 (Oct. 10, 1990).
10. Id. The project referred to was the Kansai International Airport. Id.
109 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1803 (Nov. 28, 1990).
110 See 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1843 (Dec. 5, 1990).
. Lanneaux, Recent Developments, International Trade-Joint Report of the
United States-Japan Working Group on the Structural-Impediments Initiative, 32
HARV. INT'L L.J. 245, 248-49 (1991).
... 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1843 (Dec. 5, 1990).
11S Id.
114 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 353 (Mar. 6, 1991).
11 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1843 (Dec. 5, 1990).
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dango."' In addition, more than 100 Japanese construction firms7
recently paid over $33.2 million in fines to settle charges that bids were
rigged on construction contracts for a U.S. Navy base in Yokosuka."'
6. BENEFITS OF U.S. FIRM PARTICIPATION
6.1. Joint Ventures
United States contractors who plan to seek construction work in
Japan must also plan on the type of corporate structure that they will
use. Although there are numerous vehicles for foreign entry, the two
most common methods are as general contractor and as joint ven-
turer.:" ' As the general contractor, the U.S. construction firm would
enter into contracts with its Japanese clients either directly or through
a wholly-owned foreign subsidiary. This approach is relatively simple,
but would most likely be an unsuccessful one for entering such a
"closed" construction market as Japan's.
As a joint venturer 2 ' with a Japanese company, however, a U.S.
contractor gains numerous benefits. By working in partnership with an
established Japanese firm that has business and government contacts,
knowledge of the local area, and familiarity with buildings codes, a
foreign firm can obtain a valuable learning experience in a relatively
short period of time.' Joint venturing would also seem to be the best
means for obtaining public construction contracts in the face of dango.
In response to the Major Projects Agreement, the Ministry of Con-
struction has encouraged Japanese firms to form partnerships with
U.S. contractors and to jointly participate in bidding.'2 2 Joint venturing
appeals to the Japanese because it offers the political solution of al-
lowing increased foreign participation in their domestic construction
market while still retaining all the advantages of dango which accrue
both to the contractors and to the politicians.' 23 Hajime Sako, president
116 Lawson, Usui & Ichniowski, Bechtel Wins Japan Job as Dango Firms Pay,
ENGINEERING NEws-RECORD, Jan. 4, 1990, at 17.
117 Including "Big Six" member Ohbayashi Corp. Id.
118 Id.
119 See generally Cruver, Penetrating the International Construction Market, 6
CONSTRUCTION LAW. 3 (Apr. 1986).
120 There are two types of joint ventures commonly used in Japan: an incorpo-
rated joint venture corporation or a joint venture operation without legal status. The
latter generally takes the form of an an agreement between legal entities, such as corpo-
rations, and is used most frequently by Japan's construction industry. PRICE
WATERHOUSE, DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN 69 (1990).
1 See S. LEVY, supra note 5, at 397.
122 Usui, supra note 96, at 12.
123 See id.
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of the Japan Federation of Construction Contractors (JFCC) and
chairman of Taisei Corp., has said that U.S. construction firms are
welcome to compete or cooperate, but they must accept certain funda-
mental rules, including Japan's selective bidding system (i.e. dango).
12 4
United States contractors apparently agree that it is easier to work
within the system than to change it. During the past several years, nu-
merous partnerships and joint ventures have been created between U.S.
and Japanese construction firms to pursue projects in both Japan and
the United States, including agreements between Ohbayashi Corp. and
Fluor Daniel, Inc.; Aoki Corp. and Tishman Realty and Construction
Co.;"2" Toda Construction Corp. and Schal Associates, Inc.; Kumagai
Gumi Co. and Turner Construction Co.;126 Taisei Corp. and Bechtel
Group, Inc.; 27 Shimizu Construction Co. and Parsons Corp.;1 2 and
Kawasaki Heavy Industries and the Austin Co.'29 Joint ventures and
other cooperative arrangements will play an increasingly important role
for U.S. and other foreign contractors seeking a foothold in the Japa-
nese market.
6.2. Opportunities for New Technology
Although most of these partnership agreements are for general en-
gineering and construction work, a few are more specific and deal with
only one project or one type of project. For instance, Shimizu Corp. has
an agreement with Houston-based Bell & Trotti, Inc. for long-term
planning and construction of projects in space and on the moon. 30
Takenaka Corp., the only contractor among the "Big Six" lacking a
general cooperation agreement with any foreign construction firm, will
team up with foreign contractors only on a "technology-specific, pro-
ject-by-project basis."'' These types of arrangements are precisely why
U.S. firms should be attempting to penetrate the Japanese construction
market: access to new technology.
The construction market in Japan is highly competitive, and profit
124 Dryden, Usui & Setzer, supra note 98, at 25. United States contractors must
be careful, however, not to violate any U.S. laws while bidding on Japanese projects,
such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2 (1988).
125 Id.
128 Usui, supra note 96, at 12.
127 Bechtel's Japan Plan, ENGINEERING NEWS-RECORD, Feb. 16, 1989, at 40.
128 Japan Greasing Skids for Bechtel Contract, ENGINEERING NEWS-RECORD,
May 19, 1988, at 13, 14.
129 Setzer, Korman & Usui, Are They Better? Japanese Bring More than Money
in Their Quest for U.S. Market Share, ENGINEERING NEWS-RECORD, Mar. 3, 1988,
at 30, 36.
... Dryden, Usui & Setzer, supra note 98, at 25.
1I1 Usui, supra note 95, at 12.
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margins on construction work are often far slimmer than in the United
States."3 2 But Japanese contractors lead the world in construction re-
search and development spending-at about 0.5% of firm revenues
spent on research versus at most 0.05% in the United States-while
combined spending on research for the "Big Six" alone was more than
$500 million in 1990.' Combined with the tremendous spending of
the Ministry of Construction, Japanese industry has been in a position
to develop many of the major innovations in construction equipment
and materials in recent years, particularly in the areas of robotics""
and new concrete composite technology."3 Although the U.S. construc-
tion industry maintains a technology lead in certain areas, including
computer automation, there is no industrywide commitment to substan-
tial investment in research and development. 38 Joint ventures with
Japanese contractors offer U.S. firms the opportunity to share the
wealth of this new technology before the Japanese use it to penetrate
the U.S. construction market in force.1
3 7
7. NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF OPENING THE JAPANESE
MARKET
7.1. Increased Japanese Activity in the United States
Despite the opportunities of opening up the Japanese construction
market with regard to potential revenues and new technology, trade
negotiators must be certain that they do not open a "Pandora's Box" of
trouble for U.S. contractors, both in this country and in Japan. Already
there are 22 Japanese firms performing construction work in the
132 Houston-based Brown & Root, Inc. gave up its Japanese construction license
in June 1989 because it claimed that profits from public works and other construction
jobs in that country were "slim." 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 603 (Apr. 25, 1990).
138 See Japan's Edge on U.S. Widens, ENGINEERING NEWS-RECORD, Sept. 20,
1990, at 16. Approximately 30 Japanese contractors have in-house research institutes,
with some employing as many as 300 workers. Only about five U.S. firms have such
facilities, generally employing as few as half a dozen people. See Carlton, U.S. Con-
tractors Trail Japan in R&D, Wall St. J., Aug. 6, 1991, at A2, col. 2.
134 See generally S. LEVY, supra note 5, at 283-302 (discussion of recent Japa-
nese developments in the field of construction robotics).
135 See generally id. at 353-61 (discussion of the recent Japanese development of
carbon fiber reinforced concrete (CFRC) and its various applications).
136 Saunders, A Competitive Assessment of the U.S. International Construction
Industry, in 6 LEGAL HANDBOOK FOR ARCHITECTS, ENGINEERS AND CONTRACTORS
423, 441 (A. Dib ed. 1990).
137 See generally S. LEVY, supra note 5, at 340-53 (discussion of public and pri-
vate research and development efforts in Japan); F. HASEGAWA, supra note 8, at 160-
73 (discussion of technology development as integral to the strategic planning of Japa-
nese construction firms).
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United States, with contract volume totaling $3.3 billion in 1990.'18
That figure is up from only $700 million in 1984 and less than $50
million in 1981.' s9
The increased Japanese investment in U.S. real estate over the
past decade is not unrelated to the increased construction activity.1 4°
Approximately two-thirds of all work performed by Japanese contrac-
tors in the United States is on Japanese-owned investment projects,
141
and approximately 95% of all construction work for such projects is
performed by Japanese firms.142 United States construction firms are
finding it more and more difficult to be awarded contracts by Japanese
owners in the United States.
143
With the Japanese making their own push to enter the U.S. con-
struction market, U.S. trade negotiators should be mindful of the Japa-
nese power to enter and dominate foreign markets and should be cau-
tious of what is given up for the attainment of "free trade."
7.2. Increased Foreign Activity in Japan
The recent trade negotiations between the United States and Ja-
pan were not limited in their application to U.S. contractors, and apply
equally to other foreign construction firms.1 44 South Korean firms are
particularly well-suited, for numerous cultural, political, and geo-
graphic reasons, to take advantage of the new openings and to succeed
in participating in the Japanese markets in a way that Western firms
cannot.1 45 By 1990, when Bechtel became the first U.S. member of the
Japan Federation of Construction Contractors UFCC), there were al-
ready four Korean members of that organization, 46 six Korean con-
188 The Top 250 International Contractors, ENGINEERING NEWS-REcORD, Jul.
22, 1991, at 31.
"I Hann & Usui, U.S. Beats on Japan's Closed Doors, ENGINEERING NEws-
RECORD, Jun. 12, 1986, at 10.
14" New Japanese investment in U.S. real estate peaked in 1988 at $16.5 billion.
That figure has declined in both years since, to approximately $13.1 billion in 1990,
and is estimated to be between $6 billion and $10 billion for 1991. The largest increase
in new Japanese investment, however, is in raw land for development. See Rundle,
Japanese U.S. Real-Estate Investments Fell in '90, Will Drop Again, Study Says,
Wall St. J., Mar. 28, 1991, at C19, col. 1.
141 Chalpin, supra note 3, at 3.
142 See id. at 7.
143 Id. United States construction firms who until recently could submit bids in
English for Japanese-owned projects in the United States must now submit those bids
in Japanese. Id.
144 Curl, supra note 32, at 128.
145 Id.
148 Bechtel to Join the Club, ENGINEERING NEws-RECORD, Jun. 14, 1990, at 11.
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tractors had been licensed (all without a Japanese partner), 4 ' and one
Korean firm had already won a contract for construction work in
Japan.1
48
U.S. contractors should be concerned that the inroads created by
their country's trade negotiators into the Japanese construction industry
may be dominated by other Asian contractors before they have had a
chance to attain any real progress of their own.
8. CONCLUSION
The progress made during the recent bilateral trade negotiations to
improve U.S. firm access to the Japanese construction industry has
been significant. More relaxed rules regarding licensing of contractors
and advance notification of bidding may allow greater participation by
firms previously unfamiliar and inexperienced with Japanese construc-
tion practices. Yet despite several high-profile Japanese construction
contracts that were recently awarded to U.S. firms,149 there remains a
great deal of room for improvement. Greater disincentives for the ille-
gal but politically-accepted practice of dango need to be developed. Any
pressure that the United States can exert during trade negotiations for
the reform of certain Japanese business practices will certainly have a
positive effect, but the change of an entire system of behavior built up
over decades of practice cannot reasonably be expected to occur
overnight.
In the meantime, U.S. contractors should take individual action to
establish alliances or joint ventures with Japanese firms in order to
prevent themselves from being completely shut out of the world's larg-
est construction market. The U.S. construction industry must not follow
the path of its automobile and steel industries. The benefits to be
sought, through higher revenues and access to new technologies, are too
great to ignore.
I" Usui, supra note 95, at 12. The six firms were Daewoo, Hyundai, Miryung,
Samsung, Samwhan, and Ssangyong. Id.
148 Id. The firm, Daewoo, was awarded a $5.5 million contract for sitework on a
Korean embassy in Japan. Id.
14 Bechtel was part of a group of firms that received the construction contract on
the $770 million terminal building at the Haneda Airport. Bechtel will perform about
10% of the work in a huge consortium which includes Taisei, Kajima, Shimizu,
Takenaka, Ohbayashi, Tokyu, Toda, Sato Kogyo, and Japan Airlines. Lawson, Usui
& Ichniowski, Bechtel Wins Japan Job as Dango Firms Pay, ENGINEERING NEws-
RECORD, Jan. 4, 1990, at 17. A predominantly Japanese joint venture which included
Schal Associates, Inc. of Chicago was awarded an $85 million contract for construction
of a control tower and administration building at Kansai International Airport. Schal
Venture Wins Construction Project At Japanese Airport, Wall St. J., Jan. 31, 1991, at
C6, col. 5.
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